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Abstract 
 
Pressure from negotiators on agricultural tariff reform in the Doha Round is favouring 
commitments to reduce “average” tariffs over a range of commodities.  This stems from the 
perceived need for “flexibility” in protection levels, particularly for some highly protected 
product groups like sugar, dairy products and rice.  Yet reforms that reduce the average tariff 
across agricultural products but raise tariff dispersion may well reduce welfare and therefore 
defy the spirit of the negotiations.  This paper develops a practical approach to identifying the 
policy preferences implicit in existing tariff patterns and employs these preferences in 
formulating mathematical programs that represent the primary policy formation process.  
These are solved and the effects explored of reform by reductions in either the arithmetic or 
the trade value weighted average of tariffs.  In applications to the EU and Japan, tariff 
dispersion is found to increase with either averaging formula but by more in the trade value 
weighted case. 
 
 
*  Thanks are due to Will Martin at the World Bank for proposing the research in this paper 
and for subsequent comments, and to Kym Anderson for detailed comments on the first draft. 
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Implicit Policy Preferences and Trade Reform by Tariff Aggregates 
 
 
Abstract: 
 Pressure from negotiators on agricultural tariff reform in the Doha Round is 
favouring commitments to reduce “average” tariffs over a range of commodities.  This 
stems from the perceived need for “flexibility” in protection levels, particularly for 
some highly protected product groups like sugar, dairy products and rice.  Yet reforms 
that reduce the average tariff across agricultural products but raise tariff dispersion may 
well reduce welfare and therefore defy the spirit of the negotiations.  This paper 
develops a practical approach to identifying the policy preferences implicit in existing 
tariff patterns and employs these preferences in formulating mathematical programs that 
represent the primary policy formation process.  These are solved and the effects 
explored of reform by reductions in either the arithmetic or the trade value weighted 
average of tariffs.  In applications to the EU and Japan, tariff dispersion is found to 
increase with either averaging formula but by more in the trade value weighted case. 
 
 
1. Introduction: 
The approach employs the concept of implicit welfare weights, as developed in 
the early work of Tyers (1990).  Policy formation is beset by inequalities of influence 
that stem either from the preferences of fully informed voters1 or from information 
asymmetries and hence divergences in lobbying power by producer and other groups2.  
Policy weights offer a reduced form approach to representing such unequal influences in 
models of the policy formation process.3   The weights are derived by solving the 
“inverse optimum” problem.  Conventional policy problems begin with weighted 
welfare functions and pose the question, what are the optimal interventions?  The first 
order conditions associated with such problems, however, make it possible to invert this 
question and to ask, what are the welfare weights that make a set of observed 
interventions optimal?   This paper generalises the derivation of such weights, as they 
apply to the choice of import tariffs, through the use of a full global general equilibrium 
analysis.  It also extends the scope of their derivation, at least potentially, to the full 
spectrum of commodities in the GTAP Database.  The weights, once derived, are then 
                                                 
1 Seek, for example, Downs (1957) and Grossman and Helpman (2001: Part I; and 2002: Ch.2) and 
Mayer (1984). 
2 See Olsen 1965, Anderson (1980), Anderson and Hayami (1986) and Grossman and Helpman (2001: 
Part II; and 2002: Part II). 
3 Zusman (1976) modelled the policy process as a bargaining game and showed that the resulting political 
equilibrium might be simulated as the outcome of the maximisation of a policy preference function over 
the objectives of interest groups in which the weights attached to each are constants reflecting differential 
influence. 
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used in the primary policy problem which is, this time, constrained by commitments to 
reductions in tariff aggregates such as might emerge from the Doha Round of trade 
negotiations. 
 The welfare function employed is of the Bergsonian type, which aggregates 
measures of preparedness to pay across producer and other interests in the economy.  
The weights then indicate the marginal value to the policy process of an extra dollar of 
benefit to each production and non-production interest group.4  The Cournot assumption 
is made about international policy interactions, so that the policy process in any one 
region takes the tariffs in others as given.  Producer interests are identified in each 
domestic commodity market based on real incomes from factors that are sector specific 
in the short run, along with a single aggregate of consumer and tax-payer interests.  The 
current pattern of distortions would be used to derive implicit weights for this function 
and the thus-weighted welfare function applied to comparisons of alternative “average” 
tariff reforms. 
 Once the weights are derived, a key element of this research is the reconstruction 
of the primary policy problem, this time with the known weights, to examine the effects 
on tariff dispersion of negotiated reductions in various measures of the “average” tariff 
across broad groups of products.  Popular tariff aggregation measures include the trade 
restrictiveness index (TRI: Anderson and Neary 1994), the augmented TRI (Bach and 
Martin 2001), an arithmetic average (as used in the Uruguay Round) or a trade-weighted 
average (Bureau and Slavatici 2004).  If the conclusion of the Doha Round yields a 
commitment to a quantified reduction in the level of any one of these indices, the 
objective of the analysis is then to identify what underlying tariff structure would be 
chosen by negotiating governments, whether this structure would yield an increase or a 
decrease in tariff dispersion and whether it would result in an improvement in the 
country’s economic welfare when preparedness to pay measures are equally weighted. 
 
                                                 
4 The Bergsonian social welfare function is a reduced form representation of a game between domestic 
interests, for whom a welfare transformation surface can be defined as in Tyers (1990: Figure 1) or as a 
domestic counterpart of the international game represented by Bagwell and Staiger (2002: Figure 2.4).  
the weights represent the slope of the transformation surface at the policy equilibrium. 
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2. On what the weights depend: 
 This is best illustrated with a simple example.  Consider a single commodity 
market in a small open economy that is undistorted except for a tariff on imports in that 
market, as shown in Figure 1.  The home expenditure share on this commodity is small, 
domestic demand and supply are linear in the home price, p, which is distorted relative 
to the import price, p*, by a specific tariff-come-subsidy, t, so that p = p* + t.  In this 
case there is only one producer interest and its preparedness to pay for protection 
depends on its quasi-rent, VP.  The non-producer interest can be thought of as an 
amalgam of consumers and taxpayers, on whom the welfare effects of protection can be 
measured in terms of the sum of consumer surplus and tariff revenue, VC.  As the tariff 
is changed, then, so also the welfare measures for producer and non-producer interests 
change.  Indeed, they map out a transformation surface or welfare possibility frontier 
like that shown in Figure 2. 
 The policy formation problem, then, seeks to identify the point on this surface 
that maximises a social welfare function in VP and VC, the simplest conceivable of which 
is P P C CW w V w V= + .  This has linear social indifference curves of slope /P Cw w− .  The 
social optimum is at a point of tangency, so that this slope is the same as the marginal 
rate of transformation between producer and non-producer welfare 
( /C PdV dV /P Cw w= ).  In this otherwise undistorted, small economy, when the weights 
are equal and the slope is unity, a point on the transformation surface is selected at 
which t=0.  When producer interests outweigh consumer interests, however, a point 
above this is chosen to the right of this one, where t>0 and / 1P Cw w > . 
 The inverse optimum problem, then, begins with a knowledge of the chosen 
tariff, t, and seeks to identify the corresponding marginal rate of transformation, 
/P CdV dV .  The weights therefore depend on the behaviour of the underlying 
commodity market and, particularly, on the magnitudes of its demand and supply 
elasticities.  They embody the economic cost of protection in that, where demand and 
supply are comparatively elastic and dead weight losses are high, the transformation 
surface has greater curvature, so that a comparatively costly tariff increase requires a 
larger weight on producer welfare.  This is evident in Figure 2, which shows the 
transformations surfaces for cases in which demand is elastic and inelastic.  The elastic 
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case has visibly greater curvature.  This is further evident from the plots of the slopes of 
the two frontiers in Figure 3.  When demand is elastic, delivering benefits to producers 
is shown to require movement to more steeply sloped parts of the surface, implying 
much larger relative weights on producer welfare. 
 
3. Deriving the weights in a more general model: 
 Consider an economy with n producer interests, i, each of whose welfare 
measured in equivalent income, iV , depends on a tariff of power iρ .  If inequalities and 
information asymmetries in the policy process cause it to behave as if a central planner 
were maximising a weighted welfare function, that function might take the linear form: 
(1)  
1
n
i i C C
i
W w V w V
=
= +∑  , 
where 
(2)  ( ) ( )1 1,..., , ,...,i i n C C nV V V Vρ ρ ρ ρ= =  
are structural (state) equations that embody the behaviour of the economy and its 
response to the tariffs, and CV  is an aggregation of the income equivalents of the 
welfare of non-producer interests with Cw  its associated weight. 
The implicit policy planner faces a constrained multivariate optimisation 
problem, to choose ( )1,..., nρ ρ  to maximise (1), subject to the functional constraints (2).  
This problem can be simplified, at least in principle, by substituting (2) into (1) so that 
the maximisation problem becomes unconstrained in ( )1,..., nρ ρ  and the first order 
conditions are: 
(3)  
1
0 1,
n
i C
i C
i j j
V Vw w j nρ ρ=
∂ ∂+ = ∀ =∂ ∂∑  . 
These are n conditions on n unknown tariff powers.  Provided the state equations can be 
constructed and are differentiable, this problem is readily solved. 
 Now imagine that the policy process has already performed its magic and 
yielded powers of the tariff that are observed as ( )* *1 ,..., nρ ρ , but the n+1 weights are 
unknown.  The implicit weights can then be solved from the same first order conditions, 
with the derivatives evaluated at ( )* *1 ,..., nρ ρ : 
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(4)  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* *
1
0 1,
n
i C
i C
i j j
V V
w w j n
ρ ρρ ρ ρ ρρ ρ=
∂ ∂= ⋅ + = ⋅ = ∀ =∂ ∂∑  . 
The minor problem arises that there are n+1 weights and only n first order conditions, 
so that the weights are available only in relative magnitudes.  The inverse optimisation 
problem is readily solved, however, with the addition of a condition that pins down their 
average value, such as that their arithmetic average is unity:  
(5)  
1
1
n
i C
i
w w n
=
+ = +∑  . 
Relations (4) and (5) then offer n+1 conditions in n+1 unknowns, enabling a solution 
for the vector of weights: ( )1,..., ,n Cw w w  via the inversion of an augmented welfare 
response matrix, H: 
(6)  
1
1 1,1 1, 1, 1
,1 , , 1
.. 0
.. .. .. .. .. ..
.. 0
1 .. 1 1 1
n n
n n n n n n
C
w h h h
w h h h
w n
−
+
+
               =          +    
 , 
where the elements of the H matrix are: 
(7)  
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
* * *1
1 1 1
* * *1
..
.. .. .. ..
..
1 .. 1 1
n C
n C
n n n
V VV
H
V VV
ρ ρ ρρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρρ ρ ρ
∂ ∂∂  ∂ ∂ ∂  =  ∂ ∂∂  ∂ ∂ ∂  
 . 
Critical to the analysis are the income equivalent welfare measures, 
( )1,..., ,n CV V V  and the economic behavioural (state) equations, (2).  For these, our 
analysis draws on the standard GTAP global comparative static model (Hertel et al. 
1997).  This model offers a widely familiar behavioural link between a variety of 
government interventions and factor incomes, regional incomes and regional utility 
levels.  It also offers compatibility with the GTAP Database that allows disaggregation 
of products and services into at least 50 groups.  For the purpose of estimating implicit 
weights, however, it has two drawbacks.  First, it includes a single consolidated 
household in each region and so it does not directly yield measures of interest group 
welfare.  And second, even if it did include appropriate measures of group welfare, 
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while the complete model does imply a set of state conditions (2), the equations from 
which are large in number and formulated mostly in proportional changes, making it 
extremely cumbersome to construct the derivatives in (4) analytically. 
 
Welfare measures: 
 Producer interests are assumed to be motivated by a concern over income earned 
by primary factors that are specific to their particular production process in the short 
run.   GTAP has five primary factors: land, production labour, professional labour, 
physical capital and natural resources.  A short run closure5 is constructed in which 
land, physical capital and natural resources are completely immobile between sectors.  
Income to these three primary factors is then the primary interest of producer groups.  
As indicated in the Appendix, this income, appropriately deflated by consumption price 
indices for each group, is then suitable as a money-metric for group welfare.  
Unfortunately, since GTAP offers only the one private household in each region, it is 
not possible to construct group specific indices of consumption prices with which to 
deflate group incomes.  It is therefore assumed that the consumption preferences of all 
groups are identical and group incomes are deflated by regional consumer price 
indices.6  The group incomes therefore take the form: 
(7)  ,
N A
i i i i i i
i
C
R K R N R AV
P
+ += ∀ i=1,n , 
where iR , 
N
iR  and 
A
iR  are the rental rates on physical capital, natural resources and 
land, respectively, and CP  is the regional consumer price index. 
 To calculate the income to non-producer interests (consumers and tax-payers), 
group incomes are subtracted from regional GNP and deflated by the regional consumer 
price index: 
(8)  
1
n
i
C i
iC
GNPV V
P =
= −∑  . 
 
                                                 
5 In models like GTAP the number of variables exceeds the number of equations, requiring that some 
variables be set as exogenous.  The choice as to which variables are made exogenous and which remain 
endogenous is referred to as the closure. 
6 The GTAP deflator used is the private consumption price, ppriv(r). 
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Changes in welfare measures due to tariffs: 
 Rather than construct the welfare response matrix, H, from state equations (2) 
that are condensed from the full algebraic representation of GTAP, the elements of the 
matrix are instead derived numerically by running GTAP repeatedly for small changes 
in the powers of the tariffs, ρ .  A single simulation, say one for a marginal change to 
the power of tariff j, jρ∆ , enables the observation of corresponding changes in the 
welfare measures, 1,..., ,n CV V V∆ ∆ ∆  and the approximation of the 
derivatives 1 ,..., ,n C
j j j
V VV
ρ ρ ρ
∂ ∂∂
∂ ∂ ∂ , which are the elements of the jth row of the H matrix.  
The GTAP model is used to make n such simulations, one for each of the tariff items, to 
complete the matrix.  Once the augmented H matrix is constructed the implicit weights 
are solved for using equation (6). 
 
4. The weights implicit in tariff formation by the European Union and Japan 
 The approach described in Section 2, above, is applied to the two-region, four 
product group aggregation of the GTAP Database presented in Table 1.  A focus on 
either the EU or Japan is served by aggregating to two regions (the EU and the Rest of 
the World or Japan and the Rest of the World), since tariffs in GTAP differ depending 
on the region of origin.7  Aggregation to two regions is therefore a means of 
constructing the region-generic average tariff for each imported product group.8  
Products are aggregated into four groups, two of which are agricultural.  The second of 
these, “other agriculture”, includes both raw agricultural products and processed foods.  
The observed average tariffs and the implied weights, calculated as in Section 2, above, 
are given in Table 2.9 
 The results show that the tariff formation process in both countries behaves as if 
considerably more weight is attached to producer interests than to non-producer 
                                                 
7 Tariff differences by region of origin arise in GTAP even where non-discriminatory tariffs are applied.  
They are due to differences in the commodity composition of imports from different regions.  
Aggregations turn up higher average tariffs against regions from which the product group comprises a 
comparatively large proportion of sub-products on which higher tariffs are charged. 
8 The representation of the EU in GTAP incorporates intra-EU trade.  Here the tariffs associated with 
imports to the EU from the Rest of the World are considered, via the GTAP variable tms. 
9 The H matrix is constructed from repeated simulations of the GTAP model using the Gempack and 
RunGTAP softwares. 
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interests, with “other agriculture” and manufacturing attracting the highest implicit 
weights in the EU and both agricultural sectors the highest in Japan.  It is notable that 
the average tariff on industrial products is lower in the EU than that on agricultural 
products yet the implicit weight is also large.  A high weight on industrial protection is 
required, however, to justify even low tariffs because protection of this sector in the EU 
imposes substantial external costs on other sectors and hence on other fixed factor real 
incomes.  As discussed in Section 2, where protection causes comparatively large dead 
weight losses, the transformation surface between producer and other interests has 
greater curvature and so large weights are required to justify high tariffs.  In Japan, all 
the weights depart from unity by less than in the EU, suggesting its existing distortions 
incur smaller dead weight losses, so that there is comparatively little curvature of the 
transformation surface. 
Also notable is the comparatively low weight on non-producer interests, 
particularly in the EU.  This is because these weights reflect the tariff formation process 
alone and it has traditionally been a game amongst producer interests.  It may well be, 
however, that the imbalance in this process in favour of producer interests is redressed 
in other policy arenas, such as those driving direct taxation and transfers.  The purpose 
of this exercise is not to infer the biases in the overall policy formation process but to 
focus on those implicit in that which determines the mix of tariffs levied on imports. 
 
5. Predicting the policy response to negotiated reductions in average tariffs 
 Once the biases implicit in the policy formation process have been estimated in 
the form of the vector of weights, the primary policy problem can be reconstructed with 
the now-known weights, to examine the effects on tariff dispersion of negotiated 
reductions in various measures of the “average” tariff across broad groups of products.   
 
Tariff aggregation formulae: 
Popular tariff aggregation measures include the arithmetic average (as used in 
the Uruguay Round), the trade-weighted average (Bureau and Slavatici 2004), the trade 
restrictiveness index (TRI: Anderson and Neary 1994) and the augmented TRI (Bach 
and Martin 2001).  Consider the simplest of these first: the arithmetic average of powers 
of tariffs, 
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(9)  0
1
1 n
i
in
ρ ρ
=
= ∑  
and the trade value weighted average of powers of tariffs, 
(10)  1
1
n
M
i i
i
Sρ ρ
=
 = ⋅ ∑  , 
where MiS is the share of product i in the cif value of imports.
 10  Unfortunately, unless 
the policy process employs a set of exogenous prior import shares, the import shares in 
the trade value weighted formulation are endogenous: 
(11)  
( )
( )
1
i iM
i n
j j
j
M
S
M
ρ ρ
ρ ρ
=
⋅=
⋅∑
 . 
At the outset, these shares will be assumed exogenous and to be assigned based on 
historical trade data.  The possibility that shares would be updated will be considered 
subsequently. 
 
Reformulating the primary policy problem: 
 The most sophisticated reformulation of the primary policy problem would 
embody all the analytics of the GTAP model.  Imagine that the set of endogenous 
variables defining the performance of the economy in GTAP makes up the vector x .  
The primary policy problem, then, is as follows: 
 
Problem 1:  Choose the vector ρ  to 
Maximise 
1
n
i i C C
i
W w V w V
=
= +∑  , 
subject to ( )V V x=  
  ( )x x ρ=  
0
1
1 n
i
in
ρ ρ
=
≤∑  
                                                 
10 It is also possible to average the elements of the vector of corresponding ad-valorem tariff rates, τ , in 
which case the formulae are different and might yield a different pattern of protection if such averages 
were adopted. 
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  1
1
n
M
i i
i
S ρ ρ
=
 ⋅ ≤ ∑  
  0ρ ≥ . 
In this reformulation the set of equations ( )x x ρ=  are from the structure of the GTAP 
model, while the set ( )V V x=  formulate the welfare measures in terms of GTAP 
endogenous variables.  In effect, this reformulation does no more than add inequality 
constraints on the average tariff which can be made to bind at a variety of levels of the 
average.  The complexity of the approach, however, stems from the incorporation of all 
the model’s structural equations as equality constraints. 
 
Reformulation as a linear program: 
 Imagine the substitution of  ( )x x ρ=  into ( )V V x= , yielding the functions (2), 
( )V V ρ= .  These can then be linearized around the zero tariff level, 1ρ = , so that 
(12)  ( )
1
1
n
i
i i j
j j
VV a ρ ρρ=
∂= + = ⋅ ∀∂∑ i=1,n .  
This is convenient because the gradient terms can be calculated by solving the GTAP 
model for small deviations in ρ , this time from an initial equilibrium that is free of 
tariff distortions ( 1ρ = ).  It can be done in the same way as the elements of the H 
matrix in (7) are derived.   The key difference is that the linearization is this time around 
the zero tariff point.  The reason for this will be clear once the simpler policy problem 
has been formulated. 
 The simpler reformulation is then 
 
Problem 2: choose the vector, ρ  to: 
Maximise 
1
n
j j
j
W v vρ ρ
=
= = ⋅∑  
Subject to 0
1
1 n
i
in
ρ ρ
=
≤∑  
  1
1
n
M
i i
i
S ρ ρ
=
 ⋅ ≤ ∑  
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  1ρ ≥ . 
Here the coefficients in the objective function are most important.  Since total weighted 
welfare is the weighted sum of group welfare: 
(13)  ( ) ( )
1 1 1
1 1
n n n
i C
i j C j
i j jj j
V VW w wρ ρ ρ ρρ ρ= = =
 ∂ ∂= = ⋅ + = ⋅ ∂ ∂  ∑ ∑ ∑  , 
it is the equivalent of the following sum over product lines: 
(14)  ( ) ( )
1 1
1 1
n n
i C
i C j
j i j j
V VW w wρ ρ ρρ ρ= =
 ∂ ∂= = + = ⋅ ∂ ∂  ∑ ∑  . 
And, so,  
(15)  ( ) ( )
1
1 1 , 1,
n
i C
j i C
i j j
V Vv w w j nρ ρρ ρ=
∂ ∂= = + = ∀ =∂ ∂∑  . 
Each jv  is a product of a row of the matrix H and the weights vector, where the 
elements of H are this time evaluated at the zero tariff point.  Thus, the full vector is: 
(13)  
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
1
1
1 1 1
1
1 1 1
..
..
.. .. .. ..
..1 1 1
n C
n
n C
C
n n n
V VV
w
v
w
V V V
w
ρ ρ ρρ ρ ρ
ρ ρ ρρ ρ ρ
∂ ∂∂ − = =   ∂ ∂ ∂     =     ∂ ∂ ∂   = = =   ∂ ∂ ∂ 
 . 
It is now clear why the elements of the matrix of gradients cannot be evaluated at 
*ρ ρ= .  Were this to be the case, by the first order conditions from which the weights 
are derived, (4), the vector of coefficients would be precisely zero ( 0v = ).  This is an 
envelope result that is true by definition since *ρ ρ=  is “optimal” with the calculated 
weights. 
 The bounds imposed on the average powers of the tariffs, 0ρ  and 1ρ , can be set 
to values larger than, and including, unity.  If unity is chosen, there is a unique solution 
to the problem, 1ρ =  (free trade).  If the average of observed tariff powers, *ρ ρ= , is 
chosen, the problem yields a set of “optimal” tariff powers that only approximates the 
observed tariff powers.  It is not precise because this simpler formulation is a linearized 
approximation to the full primary policy problem, detailed earlier, and it can be 
expected to be least accurate when departures from free trade are largest.  Indeed, since 
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the objective function is linear in the tariff powers, Problem 2 cannot be realistically 
unconstrained.  The larger the average is permitted to be, the larger will be the 
“optimal” tariffs.  In reality, even weighted gains from tariffs peter out when the tariffs 
are too high. 
 
Illustration of Problem 2 for the EU and Japan: 
 The coefficients from the objective function of Problem 2 are listed in Table 3.  
These are in weighted 1997 US $ billions per tariff point.  As the largest sector 
protected by tariffs, it is not surprising that the EU’s industrial sector has the highest 
policy payoff per tariff point.  The payoff is also large for the highly weighted “other 
agriculture” sector, however, and it is negative on services since the implicit welfare 
weight on services real income is very low (Table 2) and protection of the services 
sector would reduce fixed factor real income in the other more highly weighted sectors.  
In the case of Japan, the very high tariffs on agriculture and the miniscule tariffs on 
industrial products shift the payoffs in favour of agricultural protection and away from 
tariffs on industrial products and services. 
 These coefficients are employed in Problem 2 and the problem solved using the 
GAMS software.  Results are presented in Table 4.  They exhibit the unfortunate 
tendency of linear programming to yield “corner solutions”.  When tariffs are 
constrained by the arithmetic average, the Problem 2 raises the tariff on the product 
with the largest objective function coefficient – the one that yields the maximum 
weighted US$ billions per tariff point – to the maximum extent, leaving the less 
rewarding tariffs at zero (powers at unity).  This is a consequence of the absence from 
Problem 2 of diminishing returns to the policy process of raising any single tariff 
indefinitely. 
 When the binding constraint is the import value weighted average of tariff 
powers, Problem 2 turns up a slightly different result.  In the case of the EU, because 
industrial imports constitute almost two thirds of imports from non-EU regions, the 
tariff on industrial goods cannot be raised very far before the constraint binds.  Tariffs 
on “other agriculture”, however, are almost as rewarding but their import value share is 
only six per cent.  It is therefore a better option for the policy process to raise the tariff 
on other agricultural goods to the maximum extent available (until the weighted average 
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tariff ceiling is reached).  This leads to very high average tariffs on other agricultural 
goods and zero tariffs on other products.  In the case of Japan the same patter emerges 
except that the switch is between a tariff on “other agriculture” and one on crops. 
 
Reformulation as a non-linear program 
 To avoid the unfortunate tendency of the linear formulation to yield unrealistic 
corner solutions, a first step is to recognise that there are diminishing returns in 
weighted welfare to indefinite increases in individual tariffs.  This is because, as tariffs 
rise, they tend to choke off imports of the products to which they are applied and they 
raise costs in other sectors that carry high implicit welfare weights.  The extent of these 
diminishing returns can be gauged by the results discussed earlier, that when the 
objective function coefficients are evaluated at the free trade equilibrium, as in the 
formulation of Problem 2 ( ) 01 0v vρ = = ≠ .  When they are evaluated at the 
equilibrium distorted by the observed tariffs (the “optimal” policy equilibrium), 
however, they are all zero, ( )* 0 0v vρ ρ= = = . 
 Again, the brute force approach to incorporating this behaviour would be to 
return to the full-blown Problem 1.  Yet it is also possible to represent this non-linearity 
in a problem that is only slightly more complex than Problem 2.  This is achieved by 
recognising that the objective function coefficients themselves depend on the levels of 
their associated tariff powers.  Thus, ( )v v ρ=  and ( )'v ρ  is a negative definite matrix.  
The simplest way to construct these functions is to ignore cross effects between tariffs 
and recognise that the own-tariff relationship must take the form of the concave 
function illustrated in Figure 2.  Concavity is required of this function because, were it 
to be either linear or strictly convex, the objective function terms ( )i i iv ρ ρ⋅  would not 
be increasing in iρ , even at 1iρ = .  This approach is considered first. 
It is simplest to fit a quadratic function on the three conditions that: when 
0 , 1v v ρ= = , when *0,v ρ ρ= =  and when 1, 0dv
d
ρ ρ= = .  The result is the following: 
(14)  ( )0 *2 2 ** *2 2 , 1,1 2 ii i i i ii i
vv i nρ ρ ρ ρρ ρ  = − − − ∀ = − +  , 
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where the 0iv  terms are the coefficients of the objective function calculated for Problem 
2 and the *iρ  terms are the observed tariffs, presumed to be “optimal” at the outset.  
These augmented coefficients then allow the construction of a third, non-linear, primary 
policy problem: 
 
Problem 3: choose the vector, ρ  to: 
Maximise ( )0 *2 2 ** *2
1
2
1 2
n
j j
j j j j
j j j
v
W
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρρ ρ=
   = − − −  − +  ∑  
Subject to 0
1
1 n
i
in
ρ ρ
=
≤∑  
  1
1
n
M
i i
i
S ρ ρ
=
 ⋅ ≤ ∑  
  1ρ ≥ . 
 
This problem has the nice property that, like Problem 1, it yields an unconstrained 
optimum.  Unfortunately, however, the quadratic function for v  does not allow this 
unconstrained maximum to occur precisely at *ρ ρ= .  To achieve this with precision, a 
higher order polynomial might be calibrated to the shape shown in Figure 4, using the 
additional conditions that  
(15)  ( ) 0i i
i
v ρ ρρ
∂  ⋅ = ∂  and ( )
2
2 0i i
i
v ρ ρρ
∂  ⋅ < ∂  when 
*ρ ρ= . 
Even this step would lack the interactive behaviour linking tariffs in one sector to gains 
in others.  For that, a fully interactive polynomial form would be required. 
For the present purpose, however, it is sufficient to exploit the nonlinearities in 
Problem 3 to illustrate their effects on tariff formation behaviour.  To do this, the 
objective function coefficients in this problem are calibrated so that the unconstrained 
optimum tariff power vector is *ρ ρ= .11  When this is done, the tendency to yield 
                                                 
11 This entails using calibrated values for the elements of *ρ  as they appear in the objective function.  
The behaviour of the vector of coefficients, v, remains consistent with Figure 1 except that the horizontal 
intercept is shifted, usually to the right, so that the unconstrained optimum is correct.  With this 
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corner solutions disappears and the effects of constraining the averages are more 
intuitive. 
 
Illustration of the nonlinear Problem 3 for the EU and Japan: 
 At first, Problem 3 is solved unconstrained, yielding the optimal (observed) 
tariff power vector, *ρ ρ= .  Then the problem is subject to a binding constraint on the 
arithmetic average tariff power.  In successive solutions the average tariff bound is 
reduced any changes in the mix and dispersion of tariffs are noted.  Then the problem is 
subjected to a binding constraint on the trade value weighted average tariff.  Again, 
successive solutions are subjected to reductions in this bound.  The results are listed in 
Table 5. 
 In the case of the EU, as the arithmetic average is restricted, the policy process 
as represented in Problem 3 tends to sacrifice the tariff on crops (a sector with a smaller 
weight than “other agriculture” or industry and a smaller import value share) while it 
retains comparatively high tariffs on “other agriculture” and industrial products.  If the 
trade value weighted average is constrained, however, the cuts are heaviest in industry 
tariffs and least in “other agriculture”.  Although Problem 3 yields more balanced, and 
hence more realistic, cuts than the corner solutions of Problem 2, the pattern is similar.  
When the arithmetic average is constrained the sector with the largest import value 
share tends to retain its protection.  When it is the import value weighted average that is 
constrained, the retention of protection to the large-share sector (industry) restricts more 
tightly the protection that can be allocated to the other sectors.  The policy process, as 
simulated by Problem 3, then tends to sacrifice the industry tariff in favour of retaining 
high tariffs on crops and “other agricultural” imports.  The pattern for Japan is similar, 
except that the redistribution is from the tariff on “other agriculture” to that on crops.  
The very small tariff on industrial imports is sacrificed early whichever tariff average is 
used. 
 Indicators of the welfare implications of these different responses are offered in 
Table 6.  First, a trade value weighted measure of the coefficient of variation of tariff 
rates is listed.  Whichever average measure is constrained, Problem 3 yields increased 
                                                                                                                                               
approximation, the condition that ( )* 0v ρ ρ= =  is therefore sacrificed for the purpose of applying Problem 
3 in search of more realistic policy formation behaviour than that shown in Problem 2. 
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tariff dispersion by this measure, while proportional cuts in tariffs would not.  
Comparing the two average measures, there is a tendency for tariff dispersion to 
increase less when cuts are made to the arithmetic mean than when they are made to the 
trade value weighted average.  This is due to the large cuts made to the high-weight 
industrial tariff when the trade value weighted average is constrained. 
 Next, the effects on equally weighted welfare are given.  Tariff reform actually 
reduces equally weighted welfare in the EU, for two possible reasons.  First, the 
removal of tariffs alone is a second best reform given the remaining distortions 
represented in GTAP (mainly taxes on production exports and factor use).  And second, 
the tariffs shift the terms of trade in favour of the EU.  Indeed, the observed ones are 
less than “optimal” even with unweighted (meaning equally weighted) welfare, if the 
trade elasticities implied by GTAP can be believed.  Japan’s smaller economy very 
likely has smaller optimum tariffs in equally weighted welfare terms and so equally 
weighted welfare increases with tariff reform.  Consistent with the effects on tariff 
dispersion, binding the trade weighted average tariff impairs equally weighted welfare 
more than when the policy process is bound by the arithmetic average.  Finally, 
weighted welfare is shown to be reduced more by the trade weighted average tariff 
constraint.  This implies that, at least in the EU, such a constraint would place more 
strain on the policy formation process than a bound on the arithmetic average tariff. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 When countries’ trade policy formation processes are unbalanced, favouring 
some producer groups relative to others and all producer groups relative to non-
production interests, an expressed preference for “flexibility” in the Doha Round can be 
read as an indication that some tariffs will be politically easier to cut than others.  
Average cut formulae are therefore under consideration in order to offer this flexibility.  
In order to evaluate alternative measures, however, it is important to have some means 
by which the policy process, constrained by a committed reduction in an average tariff 
measure, might be predicted.  How would it alter the mix, and hence the dispersion, of 
tariffs across commodities?  This paper offers a practical approach to predicting this 
behaviour. 
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 It is assumed that the tariff formation process is differently influenced by 
producers of different products and that its resulting behaviour can be reflected in a set 
of implicit weights in a Bergsonian social welfare function.  When tariffs are observed 
as an output of their formation process, the implicit weights can be calculated from the 
“inverse optimum” problem.  It is then assumed that these weights reflect a political 
equilibrium that precedes a shock to the process, in this case the advent of the Doha 
Round.  While the Round might be successful in bringing about commitments to 
reduced average tariffs, the old implicit weights are assumed to reflect continued biases 
in tariff formation which determine the adjustment of the tariff mix across products. 
 Once implicit welfare weights have been derived, the tariff formation process is 
represented as a mathematical programming problem.  Two alternative approaches are 
trialled, with a non-linear programming problem offering the most credible results.  
Two different measures of the average tariff are constructed as constraints: the 
arithmetic average and the trade value weighted average.  When these are bound, the 
tariff mixes that result are quite different.  In illustrative analyses of the tariff formation 
processes in the EU and Japan, binding either measure of the average tariff leads to 
increased tariff dispersion and reduced overall (equally weighted as well as unequally 
weighted) welfare.  Binding the arithmetic average, however, appears to yield smaller 
increases in dispersion as the policy process is free to maintain tariff levels on products 
with high trade value shares. 
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Figure 1: Single market example 
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Figure 2: Single market: producer vs consumer/taxpayer welfare frontier 
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Figure 3: Single market: slope of the welfare frontier 
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Table 1:  Illustrative GTAP aggregation 
 
Regions: 
        European Union, EU, or Japan 
        Rest of World RoW 
 
Primary factors: 
        Land, A 
        Production labour, L 
        Professional labour, S 
        Physical capital, K 
        Natural resources, N 
 
Products: 
        Crops 
        Other agriculture 
        Industry (manufacturing, mining, minerals and energy) 
        Services 
Source: GTAP Database, Version 5. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Average tariffs and implied welfare weights 
 
 Ad valorem tariff rate, % Implied welfare weight 
European Union   
     Producer interests:   
        Crops 14.6 1.162 
        Other agriculture 34.7 1.303 
        Industry 4.2 1.257 
        Services 0.0 0.952 
     Non-production interests  0.325 
   
Japan   
     Producer interests:   
        Crops 65.4 1.021 
        Other agriculture 42.1 1.076 
        Industry 1.9 0.951 
        Services 0.0 1.018 
     Non-production interests  0.933 
Source: Analysis using GTAP and the estimation method described in the text.  The observed tariff rates 
are averages from the GTAP Database Version 5. 
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Table 3: Objective function coefficient vectors, v a, and import value shares b 
 
 European Union Japan 
 Coefficient, v Import share Coefficient, v Import share 
Crops 6.74 0.049 22.9 0.057 
Other agriculture 20.24 0.057 23.9 0.106 
Industry 25.70 0.632 8.05 0.614 
Services -7.13 0.262 -4.32 0.223 
a These are the weighted return to the policy process of increments to tariffs, measured in 1997 US$ 
billions per tariff point. 
b Import value shares are for imports from non-EU sources only, evaluated at agents (domestic) prices. 
Source: Analysis using GTAP and the estimation method described in the text, equation (13). 
 
 
Table 4: “Optimal” tariff powers from Problem 2, for different constraints on the 
arithmetic and trade value weighted averages 
 
 Crops Other agric Industry Services 
European Union     
Arithmetic average     
     1ρ =1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
     1ρ =1.1 1.0 1.0 1.4 1.0 
     1ρ =1.3 1.0 1.0 2.2 1.0 
Trade value weighted     
     2ρ =1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
     2ρ =1.1 1.0 2.8 1.0 1.0 
     2ρ =1.3 1.0 6.3 1.0 1.0 
     
Japan     
Arithmetic average     
     1ρ =1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
     1ρ =1.1 1.0 1.4 1.0 1.0 
     1ρ =1.3 1.0 2.2 1.0 1.0 
Trade value weighted     
     2ρ =1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
     2ρ =1.1 2.75 1.0 1.0 1.0 
     2ρ =1.3 6.26 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Source: Solutions of Problem 2 in the text. 
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Table 5: “Optimal” tariff powers from Problem 3, for different constraints on the 
arithmetic and trade value weighted averages 
 
 Crops Other agric Industry Services 
European Union     
Arithmetic average     
   Unconstrained, 1ρ =1.135 1.146 1.347 1.042 1.000 
     1ρ =1.10 1.068 1.296 1.036 1.000 
     1ρ =1.05 1.000 1.176 1.024 1.000 
Trade value weighted     
   Unconstrained, 2ρ =1.054 1.146 1.347 1.042 1.000 
     2ρ =1.04 1.130 1.334 1.023 1.000 
     2ρ =1.03 1.117 1.324 1.009 1.000 
Proportional cuta     
   Unconstrained, 2ρ =1.054 1.146 1.347 1.042 1.000 
     2ρ =1.04 1.108 1.257 1.031 1.000 
     2ρ =1.03 1.081 1.193 1.023 1.000 
     
Japan     
Arithmetic average     
   Unconstrained, 1ρ =1.273 1.654 1.421 1.019 1.000 
     1ρ =1.2 1.488 1.311 1.000 1.000 
     1ρ =1.1 1.242 1.158 1.000 1.000 
Trade value weighted     
   Unconstrained, 2ρ =1.094 1.654 1.421 1.019 1.000 
     2ρ =1.06 1.541 1.275 1.000 1.000 
     2ρ =1.03 1.403 1.066 1.000 1.000 
Proportional cuta     
   Unconstrained, 2ρ =1.094 1.654 1.421 1.019 1.000 
     2ρ =1.06 1.417 1.269 1.012 1.000 
     2ρ =1.03 1.209 1.134 1.006 1.000 
a Proportional cuts are in tariff rates rather than tariff powers. 
Source: Solutions of Problem 3 in the text. 
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Table 6: Welfare implications of Problem 3 responses to different constraints on 
the arithmetic and trade value weighted averages 
 
 Coefficient of variation 
of tariff rates, trade 
value weighted, %a 
Unweighted welfare: 
% departure from 
unconstrained b 
Weighted welfare: 
% departure from 
unconstrained 
European Union    
Arithmetic average    
   Unconstrained, 1ρ =1.135 147 0.0 0.0 
     1ρ =1.10 151 -0.6 -0.6 
     1ρ =1.05 153 -1.3 -2.8 
Trade value weighted    
   Unconstrained, 2ρ =1.054 100 0.0 0.0 
     2ρ =1.04 193 -1.3 -0.2 
     2ρ =1.03 255 -2.2 -0.8 
Proportional cut    
   Unconstrained, 2ρ =1.054 147 0.0 0.0 
     2ρ =1.04 147 -1.0 -0.8 
     2ρ =1.03 147 -1.7 -2.2 
     2ρ =1.00 0.0 -3.9 -9.9 
    
Japan    
Arithmetic average    
   Unconstrained, 1ρ =1.273 240 0.0 0.0 
     1ρ =1.2 298 1.8 -1.8 
     1ρ =1.1 298 2.7 -3.7 
Trade value weighted    
   Unconstrained, 2ρ =1.094 240 0.0 0.0 
     2ρ =1.06 308 1.6 -1.6 
     2ρ =1.03 372 2.3 -2.8 
Proportional cut    
   Unconstrained, 2ρ =1.094 240 0.0 0.0 
     2ρ =1.06 240 2.0 -3.2 
     2ρ =1.03 240 2.6 -6.7 
     2ρ =1.00 0.0 3.6 -10.1 
a Trade value weighted standard deviation of tariff rates divided by correspondingly weighted average of 
tariff rates. 
b Here a constant coefficient calculation is made (without diminishing returns) using the values of 
( 1, 1)v wρ = = .  Note that tariff reform reduces equally-weighted welfare in the EU, possibly because the 
removal of tariffs alone is a second best reform given remaining distortions or, more likely, because the 
tariffs shift the terms of trade in favour of the EU and hence are less than “optimal” even with equally 
weighted welfare given the trade elasticities implied by GTAP can be believed. 
Source: Solutions of Problem 3 in the text. 
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Appendix 
 
The assessment of welfare changes in terms of income equivalents should account 
for changes in both prices and income.  What is needed is the income equivalent of a 
change from price-income vector ( )0,Y0P  to ( )1,Y1P  and this is: 
(A1)  ( )( )1 1 0,W Y EV U Y∆ = + −0 1P ,P  , 
where the EV is the dollar amount that the household would be indifferent between 
accepting in lieu of the change in prices alone and it depends on the change in the 
expenditure function evaluated at the post price-change level of utility: 
(A2)  ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1, , ,EV U e U e U= −0 1 0 1P ,P P P . 
The GTAP household is assumed to have Cobb-Douglas preferences over three 
expenditure types each of which are CES subaggregates home and foreign goods.  The 
consumer price index in GTAP, used in the analysis in the text, is a composite Cobb-
Douglas-CES index consistent with the household’s expenditure function.  For 
simplicity of exposition here, consider the single stage Cobb-Douglas case.  The 
expenditure function is defined by the following optimisation problem: 
(A3)  ( )
1 1
, min i
Nn
i i i
i i
e U P X subject to U X Uα
= =
≡ = ≥∑ ∏P  . 
Solving this yields the Hicksian (compensated) demand curves: 
(A4)  1
1
j
j
N
j
jh i
i N
i
j
j
P
X U
P
α
α
α
α
=
=
=
∏
∏
 
and minimum expenditure becomes: 
(A5)  ( ) 1
1
1 1
,
j
j
j j
N
j N
j
jN N
j
j j
j j
P
Ue U U P
α
α
α αα α
=
=
= =
= = ⋅
∏ ∏∏ ∏
P , 
which is just a scaled Cobb-Douglas index of prices.  Define the consumer price index 
as: 
(A6)  
1
j
N
C j
j
P Pα
=
=∏  
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If V(P,Y) is the indirect utility function, minimum expenditure is also e[P, V(P, Y)]=Y.  
Then: 
(A7)  1
1
( , )
j
j
N
j
j
N
j
j
P
V Y Y
α
αα
=
=
=
∏
∏
P    and    1
1
( , )
j
j
N
j
j
N
j
j
V Y Y
P
α
α
α
=
=
=
∏
∏
P  . 
 
This provides all the ingredients for W∆ .  First the EV is 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) 101 1 1 1 1
1
1
, , ,
j
j
N
jC
j
N C
j
j
PEV U e U e U Y Y
P
α
α
α
α
=
=
= − = −
∏
∏0 1 0 1
P ,P P P  
which is: 
(A8)  01 1
1 1
1
C C
C C
P PEV Y Y
P P
   ∆= − = −      
 . 
The income equivalent of the combined income and price changes is then: 
( )1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
1
, ,
C
C C
C
PW Y Y EV P P Y Y Y Y
P
∆∆ = − + = − −  , 
which can be expressed in proportional change form as: 
(A9)  
1 0
1
0 0 1
1
C
C C
C
PY Y
PW Y P
W Y Y P
 ∆− − ∆ ∆ ∆ = ≅ −  . 
This is, approximately, the proportional change in real GNP or group income. 
